Introduction
An audit engagement partner is the person in the audit firm who is responsible for performing the audit and issuing the audit report. As an agent acting on behalf of other partners, the engagement partner bears the full cost of exerting effort but the benefits from exerting more effort are shared by all owners of the firm (Kandel and Lazear 1992) . The agency problem between an individual partner and other partners can be mitigated by establishing an internal system of monitoring (Balachandran and Ramakrishnan 1987) . In the auditing context, this is achieved by assigning a partner -who is independent of the audit engagement team and the client -to monitor the quality of the audit work (hereafter 'a review partner'). 1 These engagement quality reviews are mandatory for public company audits in the U.S. as well as internationally (PCAOB 2009;  International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) 2005), but they have received little attention in prior research because the names of review partners are not publicly disclosed.
The role of the engagement partner is different from that of the review partner. The primary responsibility of the review partner is to ensure that the audit does not expose the firm to potential losses from reputation impairment, regulatory sanctions, and litigation. The engagement partner shares this concern for high quality auditing, but the engagement partner also needs to maintain good relations with clients in order to generate high fee revenues (Lennox 2000; Chen et al. 2016; Newton et al. 2016) . Maintaining good client relations is not a concern for the review partner because the reviewer does not negotiate with clients over fees.
We argue that the incentives of partners are affected by their ownership stakes. For instance, if an audit failure reduces the audit firm's value by $100 million, a partner with an equity stake of 2% (1%) suffers a drop of $2 million ($1 million) in the value of her equity. The equity stake affects not only the disposal value of the partner's shares but also the partner's share of the firm's annual profits. It is now necessary to explain a typical profit-sharing arrangement before we present our predictions for the effects of equity ownership on partner incentives.
Based on interviews with audit firms, we have learned that profit sharing is affected by a partner's ownership stake as well as the partner's measured performance. To illustrate, consider the numerical example in Table 1 where the audit firm is owned by twelve partners, who individually own 2% to 15% of the firm. In this example, a partner with 15% ownership is given a performance target of 8 points, whereas a partner with 2% ownership is given a performance target of 2 points. At the end of the year, the partner is awarded points based on how well she performed on the tasks assigned during the year. Aggregating across all twelve partners, the total number of points awarded is 40 and the firm's distributable profits ($10m) are then shared between the partners based on their share of the 40 points. For instance, partner #1 receives 20% (= 8/40) of the profits, giving her $2.0m (= $10m × 20%). The crucial point with this numerical example is that the partner's profit share depends on the partner's equity stake as well as the partner's performance because the points target is set higher for partners who own more equity.
For instance, partner #1 receives $2.0m for hitting her performance target of 8 points whereas partner #5 receives $1.5m for hitting her performance target of 6 points. This profit-sharing structure ensures that partners with the same number of points receive the same share of profits, but partners are able to earn more points and therefore more of the profits if they hold a larger equity stake.
[ INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] These performance-related incentives have different consequences for review partners and engagement partners because their performance is assessed differently. The engagement partner is responsible for delivering audit quality and generating fees from the client, so her performance is assessed on both the audit quality and client satisfaction dimensions. The review partner is responsible for monitoring audit quality but is not responsible for client satisfaction because review partners do not interact with the clients whose audits they monitor. Specifically, auditing standards require that a review partner must be independent from the client and should maintain objectivity when reviewing the work of the audit engagement team (IAASB 2005 Given the different roles of engagement partners and review partners, we make the following predictions regarding the effects of ownership on their incentives. First, we predict that review partners are motivated to monitor audit quality more closely when they have larger ownership stakes. Second, larger ownership stakes have opposing effects on the incentives of engagement partners: a larger ownership stake strengthens an engagement partner's incentive to deliver a high quality audit, but at the same time a larger equity stake also strengthens the engagement partner's incentive to score well on client satisfaction because this allows the engagement partner to enjoy a bigger share of performance-related profits (see Table 1 ).
We measure audit outcomes using the adjustments that are made to a client's reported earnings during the audit. Recent studies have shown that audit adjustments reverse the effects of earnings management and improve the quality of audited earnings (Lennox et al. 2016; Lennox et al. 2018 ). We predict a positive association between audit adjustments and the equity ownership of review partners because we expect review partners to monitor audit quality more closely when they have larger ownership stakes. In contrast, we do not make a signed prediction for engagement partners because a larger ownership stake creates conflicting incentives for them.
On one hand, a larger ownership stake strengthens the engagement partner's incentive to deliver a high quality audit which makes the relation between ownership and adjustments more positive.
On the other hand, a larger ownership stake strengthens the engagement partner's incentive to please the client's management which makes the relation more negative.
We choose China as our research setting for three reasons. First, China's Ministry of Finance (MOF) has provided us with data on equity ownership for every engagement partner and review partner. These ownership data are typically unavailable in other countries. Second, China's Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) has provided us with proprietary information on the identity of review partners from 2013 to 2015 for all public company audits. We are therefore able to identify the review partners on each audit as well as the engagement partners (the names of engagement partners are publicly disclosed). Finally, data on audit adjustments are available in China but not in other countries (He et al. 2018) . We use these data to examine how audit adjustments are affected by the equity ownership of review partners and engagement partners.
Our sample covers the three-year period from 2013 to 2015 and consists of 5,413 companyyear observations. We strengthen our causal inferences by controlling for company fixed effects, audit firm fixed effects, year fixed effects, and time-varying characteristics of companies and audit partners. Consistent with our first prediction, we find significant positive associations between audit adjustments and the equity ownership of review partners. This suggests that a larger ownership stake motivates review partners to provide stricter monitoring of audit quality.
In additional analyses, we show that the review partner's ownership stake has significant positive effects on downward audit adjustments (i.e., the adjustments that reduce reported earnings) but an insignificant effect on upward audit adjustments (i.e., the adjustments that increase reported earnings). This is consistent with overstatements being more costly to review partners than understatements (Lennox et al. 2016; Lennox et al. 2018) .
In contrast to our strong positive results for review partners, we find negative or insignificant associations between audit adjustments and the equity ownership of engagement partners. Moreover, the associations between audit adjustments and ownership are significantly more negative for engagement partners than review partners, suggesting that review partners have a greater concern for audit quality. Overall, our findings suggest that larger ownership stakes motivate review partners to monitor audit quality more closely, but larger ownership stakes do not motivate engagement partners to deliver higher quality audits.
Our study makes four contributions to the literature. First, as far as we are aware, this is the first empirical study to examine the equity ownership of audit partners. There are studies in economics and finance that examine managerial ownership (e.g., Morck et al. 1988; Himmelberg et al. 1999) , but this literature does not easily translate to the audit setting because the agency problems are different in partnerships. In corporations, agency problems arise between inside management and outside shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976) , whereas in partnerships there are no outside shareholders. Instead, the agency problems in partnerships arise between the partners who are firm insiders. The theoretical literature proposes that the agency problems in partnerships can be resolved through internal monitoring mechanisms; i.e., partners directly monitor each other (Balachandran and Ramakrishnan 1987; Huddart and Liang 2005) . Our study offers the first empirical evidence that monitoring improves audit quality and that monitoring is more effective if the review partner has a larger ownership stake.
Second, prior results on the relation between managerial ownership and corporate performance are mixed. Morck et al. (1988) find a positive relation between managerial ownership and corporate performance in cross-sectional regressions, but this result becomes statistically insignificant after controlling for company fixed effects (Himmelberg et al. 1999) . In contrast, our significant results are obtained using stringent panel data models that control for both company fixed effects and audit firm fixed effects.
Third, our findings provide new insights into how review partners affect audit outcomes.
Engagement quality reviews are an important element in establishing a basis for investor reliance on audits (PCAOB 2004) , and deficient audits have been attributed to poor quality monitoring from review partners (Messier et al. 2010; Kraussman and Messier 2015) . However, review partners are rarely examined in the auditing literature because it is difficult for researchers to identify who the review partner is on any given audit engagement.
Finally, our study has potential ramifications for regulators in the U.S. (PCAOB) and China (CICPA and CSRC) as neither country requires reviewers to own any equity. 3 Our findings suggest that equity ownership motivates the review partners to monitor audit quality more closely. Therefore, it might be a good idea for regulators to require reviews to be performed by equity partners rather than non-equity partners in order to strengthen the monitoring function.
Background and hypotheses development

The ownership structures and agency problems of audit firms
The ownership structures and agency problems in audit firms are different from those in 3 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) directed the PCAOB to include in its auditing standards a requirement that a 'qualified' person must review every SEC audit. The PCAOB's engagement quality review standard was adopted in 2009, with the Board stating that a well-performed review can serve as an important safeguard against erroneous or insufficiently supported audit opinions-+. Although the PCAOB requires reviewers to have the 'partner' title, the PCAOB has stated that the review partner does not have to be an equity partner. In practice, many partners do not own equity despite their partner title. These non-equity partners are sometimes known as 'salaried' partners because they are senior employees who do not hold equity stakes.
companies. In public corporations, the agency problems arise from a separation of ownership and control as most equity is owned by outsiders rather than insiders (Jensen and Meckling 1976) . In contrast, audit firms are privately owned by equity partners rather than outside shareholders.
Equity partners work for their firms and are therefore insiders.
One advantage from organizing as a partnership rather than as a corporation is that the partnership organizational form allows the firm to send a stronger signal of service quality.
Partnerships provide higher quality services than corporations because partners own the entire firm and are therefore motivated to monitor each other (Levin and Tadelis 2005) . Such monitoring is less effective in corporations where most of the equity is owned by outsiders. Consequently, organizing as a partnership sends a signal to customers that they can expect a high level of service quality. The analytical model of Levin and Tadelis (2005) therefore explains why accounting and law firms tend to be fully-owned partnerships rather than diffusely-owned corporations.
According to Levin and Tadelis (2005) , the customers of accounting and law firms are imperfectly informed about service quality and so these firms organize as partnerships in order to signal that they are motivated to provide high quality services. 4 In audit firms, the owners (i.e., equity partners) are workers as well as shareholders. As such, shirking is an important agency problem. Shirking can occur because each individual partner bears the full cost of exerting effort but the benefits (i.e., higher profits) are shared among all the equity partners (Kandel and Lazear 1992) . In an analytical model, Balachandran and Ramakrishnan (1987) show that shirking can be mitigated by establishing an internal system of monitoring. In an audit firm, this involves assigning a partner who is independent of the audit engagement to review the quality of the audit work. In addition to engagement quality reviews, partnerships use profit-sharing agreements to reward partners for good performance. As illustrated in Table 1 , profits are shared according to the partner's measured performance as well as the partner's equity ownership.
Engagement quality reviews
Starting in the 1970s, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) made engagement quality reviews mandatory for audits of SEC registrants. 5 This requirement remained in place when regulation of the auditing profession was transferred to the PCAOB. The PCAOB's auditing standard on engagement quality reviews (EQR) was adopted in 2009, with the Board stating that a "well-performed EQR can serve as an important safeguard against erroneous or insufficiently supported audit opinions and, accordingly, can contribute to audit quality."
The PCAOB is not the only regulatory agency that requires engagement quality reviews. auditing standards on engagement quality reviews have been very similar to international and U.S. auditing standards. 6 In these countries, the review partner is required to evaluate the judgments of the audit engagement team and assess the significance and disposition of corrected and uncorrected misstatements identified during the audit. Thus, the review partner can have a significant effect on the adjustments that are made to the client's financial statements during the course of the audit. The review partner is required to conduct the review in a timely manner at 5 At that time, they were referred to as 'concurring partner reviews' rather than 'engagement quality reviews '. 6 Since 2006, the CICPA has had two standards relating to engagement quality reviews: Standard No. 1121 -Quality Control for Historical Financial Information Audit, and Standard No. 5101 -Engagement Quality Control. Relevant excerpts from these standards are provided in Appendix A. appropriate stages during the engagement so that significant matters may be promptly resolved to the reviewer's satisfaction before the audit report is issued. When a reviewer makes recommendations that the engagement partner does not accept and the matter is not resolved to the reviewer's satisfaction, the audit report must not be issued until the matter is resolved by following the firm's procedures for dealing with differences of opinion.
In both the U.S. and China, the reviewer is required to be a 'qualified person' but there is no requirement for the reviewer to own any equity in the audit firm. The PCAOB requires the reviewer to be a 'partner' (AS 7), but this does not mean that the reviewer has to be an equity partner. The PCAOB has said that both equity and non-equity partners are allowed to review SEC audit engagements (PCAOB 2004) . Non-equity partners are salaried employees who do not partake in profit-sharing, but are allowed to lead audit engagement teams, sign audit reports, and conduct engagement quality reviews. Most audit firms employ non-equity partners and the number of non-equity partners in U.S. audit firms has nearly doubled over the past decade (Katz 2015; Rosenberg 2015) . 7 Similar to the U.S., China's Auditing Standard No. 1121 requires the reviewer to be a partner but not necessarily an equity partner. The main stipulation in both the U.S. and Chinese auditing standards is that the reviewer must not be a part of the audit engagement team and must have sufficient and appropriate experience and authority to objectively evaluate the significant judgments made by the auditors and the conclusions reached in formulating the audit opinion.
Prior research on engagement quality reviews
It has proved difficult for researchers to examine the effectiveness of engagement quality reviews because the names of reviewers are not publicly disclosed. Two studies address this challenge using data from SEC and PCAOB enforcement actions. Messier et al. (2010) identify 28 cases in which reviewers are sanctioned for violating the auditing standards. The violations relate to a lack of professional care (23 cases), a lack of professional skepticism (22 cases), over-reliance on management representations (20 cases), and a failure to consider materiality (5 cases).
Approximately half the 28 enforcement actions resulted in the reviewer being barred from public company audits. In an updated analysis with similar conclusions, Kraussman and Messier (2015) find an additional 16 sanctions against engagement quality reviewers in the period since 2009.
Concerns about ineffective engagement quality reviews have surfaced in China as well.
In an interview with the authors, the Chief Accountant Office of the CSRC informed us that audit firm inspections had uncovered substantive deficiencies in reviews. The inspection findings prompted the CSRC to introduce a requirement for audit firms to tell the CSRC the names of reviewers for each public company audit engagement starting in 2013. The CSRC has provided these names to us for the purposes of academic research. 8 In addition, Chinese audit reports publicly disclose the names of the audit engagement partners. These two data sources allow us to identify the review partner and engagement partner on each audit.
Hypotheses development
Equity ownership can affect a partner's incentives in two ways. First, a partner with greater ownership has an incentive to work harder in order to increase the terminal value of her shares, which are usually cashed in upon retirement. Second, a partner with greater ownership has stronger performance-related incentives because the partner's share of annual profits depends on the partner's ownership stake as well as her performance (see Table 1 ).
The review partner is responsible for monitoring the quality of audit work but is not responsible for generating fees from the client whose audit she is monitoring. This means the performance assessments of reviewers are based on the quality of their monitoring. We expect a larger ownership stake motivates the review partner to monitor audit quality more closely.
When material misstatements are discovered during an audit, the auditors should propose correcting entries to the client's financial statements; i.e., audit adjustments. Prior research shows that these audit adjustments increase earnings quality (Lennox et al. 2016 ) and reverse the effects of opportunistic earnings management (Lennox et al. 2018) . Review partners have to assess whether sufficient audit evidence has been collected by the audit engagement team to provide reasonable assurance that any material misstatements have been detected and corrected. Moreover, reviewers must assess the significance of any corrected and uncorrected misstatements found during the audit. Greater scrutiny from the reviewer is likely to result in more adjustments and larger adjustments to the client's financial statements. In addition, analytical research suggests that engagement quality reviews motivate engagement partners to conduct more rigorous audits (Matsumura and Tucker 1995) . To the extent that the engagement partner anticipates stricter monitoring when the review partner holds a larger ownership stake, we would expect the audit team to undertake more testing, which is likely to result in more audit adjustments. Overall then, we hypothesize a positive association between audit adjustments and the equity ownership of the review partner.
H1. Audit adjustments are positively associated with the equity ownership of the review partner.
The audit engagement partner is responsible for delivering a high quality audit and, unlike the review partner, the engagement partner is also responsible for generating fees from the client. A larger ownership stake can strengthen the engagement partner's incentives to deliver a high quality audit but, at the same time, a larger ownership stake can also increase the engagement partner's incentives to please the client. Because of these conflicting incentives, the sign of the relation between audit adjustments and the equity ownership of engagement partners is ambiguous. A larger ownership stake strengthens the engagement partner's incentive to deliver a high quality audit which is likely to lead to more, and larger, audit adjustments, but a larger ownership stake also strengthens the engagement partner's incentive to please the client, which may result in fewer and smaller audit adjustments. Given these conflicting incentives, our hypothesis for engagement partners is stated in the null form:
H2. There is no relation between audit adjustments and the equity ownership of the engagement partner.
Combining the arguments for H1 and H2, we expect the relation between audit adjustments and equity ownership to be more positive for review partners than engagement partners because the reviewer is responsible for monitoring audit quality but is not responsible for generating fees from the client. Therefore, our final hypothesis, which compares the incentives of review partners and engagement partners, is stated in the alternative form.
H3. The relation between audit adjustments and equity ownership is more positive for review partners than engagement partners.
Sample and descriptive statistics
Sample
Our study relies on three sets of proprietary data: (1) the identity of the review partner on each engagement, (2) the equity ownership of the review partner and engagement partner, and (3) the audit adjustments to earnings. The CSRC started to collect the identities of review partners for public company audits from 2013 onwards while the audit adjustment data are available up to 2015, so our sample spans the three-year period from 2013 to 2015. We obtain data on the equity ownership of each partner from the MOF.
Panel A of Table 2 shows the sample screening process. From 2013 to 2015, there are 7,733 annual observations for publicly traded companies in the CSMAR database and 6,020 in the MOF database. Merging the two databases yields 5,858 observations. We drop 250 observations where there are inconsistencies between the CSMAR and MOF databases in the values of audited earnings. 9 We further drop 195 observations with missing data. 10 The final sample therefore consists of 5,413 observations. 11 [INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] Panels B and C of Table 2 partition the sample by year and industry. Panel B shows the sample is fairly evenly distributed across the three years. Panel C shows that the industry composition of the sample is similar to that of the population. Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics (variable definitions are provided in Appendix B). We examine both the incidence and magnitude of audit adjustments. The audit adjustment indicator variable (ADJDUM) equals one if there is an adjustment to earnings during the audit; i.e., the company's audited earnings number (EAUD) is different from its pre-audit earnings number (EPRE), where both numbers correspond to the same fiscal-year. As shown in Table 3 , there is an adjustment to earnings on 59% of audits. Our continuous measures of adjustments are based on ADJMAG, which equals the absolute magnitude of the adjustment to earnings scaled by the absolute value of pre-audit earnings (i.e., ADJMAG = (|EAUD − EPRE|/|EPRE|)). For example, an adjustment that reduces earnings from $10 million to $9 million has a value of 10% for ADJMAG.
Descriptive statistics
As shown in Table 3 , there are large outliers for ADJMAG, which has a median of 0.004 and a maximum of 9459.292. The outliers are attributable to some companies having pre-audit earnings close to zero. Employing the natural log transformation of (one plus) ADJMAG and winsorizing at the 99 th percentile helps to mitigate the outliers, as the winsorized values of LnADJMAG range from 0.000 to 1.080. 12 To more fully mitigate the outlier problem, we also use a ranktransformation of the unwinsorized adjustment variable (Rank(ADJMAG)) following Kane and Meade (1998) . 13 Table 3 shows that the mean equity ownership of the review partner (OWN_REV) is 1.128%, with a lower quartile of 0.010% and an upper quartile of 1.480%. The minimum value of OWN_REV is 0.000% which reflects that some reviewers are non-equity partners.
Chinese audit reports typically disclose the names of two engagement partners: one is the lead engagement partner who oversees the audit, while the other is a more junior partner who is responsible for supervising the day-to-day audit field work. We measure the ownership stakes of both the lead engagement partner (OWN_ENG1) and the second, more junior, engagement partner (OWN_ENG2). As expected, the lead engagement partner owns more equity than the junior engagement partner -the mean values of OWN_ENG1 and OWN_ENG2 are 1.360% and 0.298%, respectively. The ownership stakes of the lead engagement partners are similar to the ownership stakes of the review partners, whereas the junior engagement partners usually do not own any equity (the minimum and 75 th percentile values of OWN_ENG2 are 0.000%). As the junior engagement partner is usually a non-equity partner, we estimate the regressions using their aggregate ownership (OWN_ENG = OWN_ENG1 + OWN_ENG2) as well as the ownership of each engagement partner separately (OWN_ENG1 and OWN_ENG2). The mean value of the engagement partners' combined equity ownership (OWN_ENG) is 1.658%, which exceeds the mean ownership of the review partner (1.128%). 14 We measure partner experience as the number of years since the partner received the certified public accountant (CPA) license. As expected, the review partner and lead engagement partner are more experienced than the junior engagement partner. The mean years of experience are 15.311 for the review partner (EXP_REV), 15.837 for the lead engagement partner (EXP_ENG1), and 9.503 for the junior engagement partner (EXP_ENG2). The partners also differ in terms of how many public company clients they service during the year (our measure of the partner's client workload includes the number of reviews as well as the number of audits). On average, the review partner works on 10.471 public company audits (PORT_REV), the lead engagement partner works on 4.943 public company audits (PORT_ENG1), while the junior engagement partner works on 2.220 (PORT_ENG2). These statistics reflect that: 1) the review partners and lead engagement partners are relatively senior, and 2) the reviewers are able to work on more audits than the engagement partners because it is less time-consuming to review an audit than to conduct an audit. Overall, we surmise that, on average, the review partner is as experienced as the lead engagement partner, while the junior engagement partner -who is responsible for the audit field work and is usually a non-equity partner -is less experienced. 15 Table 3 also presents descriptive statistics for the company characteristics. Mean leverage (LEV) is 43.7% and the mean return on assets (ROA) is 3.5%. State-owned companies (SOE) account for 37.7% of the sample and the mean length of audit firm tenure (TENURE) is 6.8 years.
These statistics are comparable to those reported in prior studies of China.
[ INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
Empirical models
We test H1-H3 by estimating the following baseline model of audit adjustments:
Under H1, we predict a positive relation between audit adjustments and the equity ownership of review partners (α1 > 0). Under H2, we test whether audit adjustments are related to the equity ownership of engagement partners (α2). Under H3, we predict that the association between audit adjustments and equity ownership is more positive for review partners than engagement partners (α1 > α2).
The dependent variables in eq. (1) Table 4 presents a correlation matrix for the variables. We note the following pair-wise correlations. First, the ownership stakes of review partners and engagement partners (LnOWN_REV and LnOWN_ENG) are positively correlated (Pearson correlation coefficient = 0.48). This largely reflects an audit firm size effect; i.e., larger audit firms have more partners, which causes the average ownership stake of a partner to be smaller. For example, the mean partner ownership stake in a firm with 10 partners is 10% whereas the mean partner ownership stake in a firm with 100 partners is 1%. This audit firm characteristic is controlled for in our regressions by including audit firm fixed effects. This means we are exploiting only the within-firm variation in partner ownership, not the variation that is attributable to differences in audit firm size.
Correlation Matrix
[ INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] Second, the correlation between equity ownership and partner experience is positive and highly significant. This confirms that senior partners are more experienced and have larger ownership stakes. The correlation between equity ownership and the size of the partner's client portfolio is also positive and significant. Overall, these findings suggest that it is important to control for partner experience and the size of the partner's portfolio.
Finally, the pairwise correlations between partner ownership and audit adjustments do not consistently support the hypotheses. However, it is important to note that these univariate correlations fail to control for important characteristics of audit clients and audit firms that affect both adjustments and partner ownership. In particular, small audit firms tend to have larger ownership stakes because they have fewer partners, but small audit firms also tend to have the higher risk clients that are more likely to require audit adjustments. We control for these confounds in our regressions by including company fixed effects, audit firm fixed effects, and other time-varying control variables. A caveat for Cols. (1) and (2) is that the sample size is considerably reduced (from 5,413
Regression Results
Main results
to 1,477) as observations are dropped from the fixed effects logit specification when a company exhibits no variation in the binary dependent variable (ADJDUM) over the three year sample period. 16 This concern is not present in the other columns of The results for review partner ownership are economically significant as well as statistically significant. For example, when the review partner's ownership increases from the first quartile (0.01%) to the third quartile (1.48%), with all other covariates fixed at their means, the mean predicted probability of an adjustment increases from 54.7% to 61.5%, while the mean predicted size of the adjustment (LnADJMAG) increases from 4.48% to 6.72%. 17 In contrast, when the engagement partner's ownership increases from the first quartile (0.47%) to the third quartile (2.17%), the mean predicted probability of an audit adjustment drops from 61.6% to 56.8%, and the change in the predicted adjustment size is small (from 5.90% to 5.92% for LnADJMAG).
Results for the control variables show that the client portfolio of the junior engagement partner (PORT_ENG2) is significantly and positively related to the incidence and magnitude of audit adjustments (z-stat. = 2.64; t-stats. = 1.65, 3.10). Further, there is a positive relation between audit adjustments and the experience of the lead engagement partner (EXP_ENG1) (z-stat. = 2.10; t-stats. = 1.93, 1.50). In addition, audit adjustments are significantly larger when the length of tenure between the audit firm and client is longer (TENURE) (t-stats. = 2.16, 2.39, 3.11, 3.18).
Income-increasing and income-decreasing audit adjustments
We argue that a larger ownership stake motivates the review partner to monitor audit quality more closely because the partner has more to lose if she has a larger equity stake. From the perspective of the review partner, an earnings overstatement is likely to be costlier than an understatement because an overstatement poses a greater threat of reputation impairment and regulatory sanctions. Prior research shows that auditors correct these overstatements by requiring more downward adjustments to earnings (Lennox et al. 2018) . Therefore, we expect the ownership of review partners to be particularly important for motivating downward adjustments.
We examine this by re-running our tests separately for downward and upward adjustments.
We first restrict the sample to observations with zero adjustments or downward adjustments. The results are reported in Panel A of Table 6 . We find the equity ownership of review partners (LnOWN_REV) to be highly significant in explaining the incidence and magnitudes of downward adjustments. In other words, there are more downward adjustments and the downward adjustments are significantly larger when the review partner has a larger equity stake (z-stat. = 4.57; t-stats. = 2.69, 3.59). In contrast, the equity ownership of engagement partners (LnOWN_ENG) is negatively associated with the incidence and magnitudes of downward adjustments, and the associations are statistically significant in two of the three specifications (z-stat. = −2.02; t-stats. = −1.06, −1.67). In addition, the coefficients on LnOWN_REV are significantly more positive than the coefficients on LnOWN_ENG in all three models (Chi-sq.
= 23.32; F-stats. = 8.00, 12.55). Overall, these findings suggest that equity ownership motivates review partners to require downward adjustments to earnings, but equity ownership does not motivate the engagement partners to require downward adjustments.
[INSERT Table 5 are primarily due to downward adjustments rather than upward adjustments. This makes sense as earnings overstatements pose a greater risk to the review partner than understatements.
Ownership concentration within audit firms
Small audit firms have relatively few equity partners and so their ownership structures are highly concentrated among a few partners. In contrast, large audit firms have more equity partners and so their ownership stakes are more widely dispersed. The size of the audit firm affects not only ownership concentration but also the value of an ownership stake. For instance, an ownership stake of 1% in a large firm is more valuable than the same ownership stake in a small firm.
Therefore, the incentive effects of a larger ownership stake are likely to be greater in the larger audit firms whose ownership structures are less concentrated.
For each audit firm-year, we compute the Herfindahl index of ownership concentration (HERF), which equals the sum of squared ownership percentages for each partner in the firm. 18 Untabulated descriptive statistics show that the mean number of equity partners per firm-year is 68, with the minimum (maximum) number being 23 (338). The large variation in the number of equity partners translates into a large variation in ownership concentration across audit firms.
The Herfindahl index ranges from 0.000 to 0.284, with large audit firms having less concentrated ownership.
Next, we re-estimate the audit adjustment models after partitioning the sample based on the median value of HERF. In Table 7 , the low concentration sub-sample is shown in Cols. (1), (3), and (5), while the high concentration subsample is shown in Cols. (2), (4) [ INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] In an additional untabulated test, we partition the sample based on the size of the audit firm, which is highly correlated with ownership concentration. We code BIGAUD as equal to one if the audit firm is consistently ranked as a top-10 firm based on the CICPA's national ranking during 2013-2015, and zero otherwise. The correlation between BIGAUD and the partitioned ownership concentration variable (i.e., Low HERF) is 0.76, which confirms that large audit firms tend to have low ownership concentration. After partitioning the sample on audit firm size, the untabulated results are very similar to those shown in Table 7 . In particular, the LnOWN_REV coefficients are larger for the reviewers at large audit firms than the reviewers at small audit firms (i.e., 1.449 vs. 0.786; 0.042 vs. 0.018; 0.108 vs. 0.046). We conclude that the incentive effects of a larger ownership stake are greater in the large audit firms because a 1% stake in a large firm is more valuable than the same stake in a small firm.
Additional analyses
Equity versus non-equity partners
In China (as well as the U.S.) there is no requirement for engagement quality reviewers to be equity partners. In our sample, 75.4% of the 5,413 audits are reviewed by equity partners, whereas 24.6% are reviewed by non-equity partners. To investigate the implications of being an equity partner rather than a non-equity partner, we replace the continuous measure of ownership with an indicator variable, DUM_OWN_REV, which equals one if the reviewer is an equity partner and zero if the reviewer is a non-equity partner. In our sample, 91.1% of the senior engagement partners own equity, whereas 16.3% of the junior engagement partners own equity. We replace the continuous measures of engagement partner ownership with indicator variables DUM_OWN_ENG1 and DUM_OWN_ENG2, which equal one if the engagement partner is an equity partner and zero if she is a non-equity partner. We then re-estimate the audit adjustment models using these indicator variables for equity ownership.
Untabulated results show that the coefficients on DUM_OWN_REV are positive and statistically significant (z-stat. = 3.36; t-stats. = 2.55, 3.42). In contrast, none of the coefficients on DUM_OWN_ENG1 and DUM_OWN_ENG2 are statistically significant. 19 These results suggest that reviewers provide more monitoring when they are equity partners, whereas engagement partners do not deliver higher audit quality when they are equity partners. These results are important for audit firms and regulators because they suggest that monitoring is less effective when the engagement quality reviewers are non-equity partners.
Review partners who only conduct reviews versus review partners who also act as engagement partners
In our sample, 52.2% of the engagement quality reviews are performed by a partner who only conducts reviews, whereas the remaining reviews are performed by a partner who acts as a reviewer on some audits and an engagement partner on other audits. The 'review-only' partners focus their efforts on monitoring whereas the reviewers who also conduct audits are less specialized in the monitoring function. We explore whether this difference between reviewers affects our results.
We partition the sample into audits reviewed by review-only partners and audits where the reviewers act as engagement partners on other audits. Untabulated results show that the coefficients on LnOWN_REV are positive and significant in the sub-sample of review-only partners (z-stat. = 2.34; t-stats. = 2.30, 1.64). The coefficients on LnOWN_REV are also positive in the sub-sample where reviewers act as engagement partners on other audits (z-stat. = 1.72; t-stats. = 1.62, 1.91). Untabulated tests show that the coefficients on LnOWN_REV are not significantly different between the two sub-samples. In both sub-samples, the coefficients on LnOWN_ENG are mostly insignificant.
Additional characteristics of partners
In the main models, we control for each partner's experience (measured as the number of years since obtaining the CPA license) as well as the number of audits on which each partner works.
The partner experience variable is highly correlated with the partner's age which is why we do not include age variables in our regressions. As a sensitivity test we control for the age of each partner (Age_REV, Age_ENG1, Age_ENG2) instead of experience. We also control for the partner's gender (Female_REV, Female_ENG1, Female_ENG2) and educational level (Edu_REV, Edu_ENG1, Edu_ENG2 equal one if the partner has a bachelor or higher degree, and zero otherwise). We do not include gender and education in our main regressions because doing so causes additional sample attrition due to missing data.
Untabulated results show that our main conclusions remain unchanged after controlling for age, gender, and education. Specifically, the coefficients on LnOWN_REV remain positive and significant (z-stat. = 3.11; t-stats. = 2.64, 3.09), whereas those on LnOWN_ENG are either significantly negative (for the incidence of audit adjustments), or insignificant (for the magnitude of audit adjustments). The age, gender, and education variables are mostly insignificant with the following exceptions: (1) an older lead engagement partner (Age_ENG1) is associated with more audit adjustments (z-stat. = 2.21); (2) a female review partner (Female_REV) is associated with fewer audit adjustments (z-stat. = −2.06); and (3) a female junior engagement partner (Female_ENG2) is associated with larger audit adjustments (t-stats. = 2.04, 2.57).
Conclusion
Due to a lack of publicly available data, there is relatively little evidence on the ownership and organization of audit firms. In this study we use three unique data sources to help open the black box: 1) we examine the equity ownership stakes of audit partners, 2) we distinguish between review partners (those responsible for monitoring audit quality) and engagement partners (those responsible for delivering high audit quality and client revenues), and 3) we examine the adjustments that are made to a client's reported earnings during the audit. These data allow us to provide important insights into how audit firms incentivize and monitor their partners.
We predict that review partners have stronger incentives to monitor audit quality when they have larger equity stakes. Consistent with this, we find significant positive associations between audit adjustments and the equity ownership of review partners. When we distinguish between reviewers who are equity partners versus those who are non-equity partners, we find that audit adjustments occur more often, and are larger, when the reviewer is an equity partner.
This is important because current auditing standards do not require reviewers to be equity partners; the reviewers hold the title of 'partner' but they are not required to own equity. Our results suggest that monitoring can be strengthened by requiring reviewers to be equity partners.
This is important given the concerns of regulators about a lack of adequate monitoring from reviewers (Messier et al. 2010; Kraussman and Messier 2015) .
As audit firms are fully owned by equity partners, a transfer of equity to review partners would have to come from other partners in the same audit firm. Therefore, it is important to consider the incentives of engagement partners as well as review partners. We find that audit adjustments are negatively or insignificantly associated with the ownership of engagement partners. This does not support the view that larger ownership stakes motivate engagement partners to deliver higher quality audits. Collectively, these results suggest that a transfer of equity from engagement partners to review partners could help to improve audit quality.
Our study is subject to a couple of limitations. First, we are not able to examine all the incentives that affect partner behaviour. Equity ownership stakes are an important part but do not comprise all of the incentives that partners face. For instance, we are not able to measure a junior partner's incentives to achieve promotion to the senior ranks or the incentives of a nonequity partner to become an equity partner. Second, we acknowledge that we are not able to observe all the factors that explain how partners are assigned to clients. We attempt to mitigate potential concerns about unobservables by controlling for company fixed effects, audit firm fixed effects, year fixed effects, as well as the time-varying characteristics of companies and audit partners. Moreover, the concerns about unobservables are lessened because we have different predictions and findings for review partners compared to engagement partners even though they are assigned to the same client. This suggests that our results are unlikely to be attributable to unobservable client characteristics. Nevertheless, our results should be interpreted with caution to the extent that we are unable to control for all the determinants of client-partner matching. Article 8. The engagement quality control reviewer is defined as a partner, other person in the firm, suitably qualified external person, or a team made up of such individuals, none of whom is part of the engagement team, with sufficient and appropriate experience and authority to objectively evaluate the significant judgments the engagement team made and the conclusions it reached in formulating the auditor's report.
Article 33. The engagement partner shall: (i) Determine that an engagement quality control reviewer has been appointed by the firm; (ii) Discuss significant matters arising during the audit engagement, including those identified during the engagement quality control review, with the engagement quality control reviewer; and (iii) Not date the auditor's report until the completion of the engagement quality control review.
Article 34. The engagement quality control reviewer shall perform an objective evaluation of the significant judgments made by the engagement team, and the conclusions reached in formulating the auditor's report. This evaluation shall involve:
(i) Discussion of significant matters with the engagement partner; (ii) Review of the financial statements and the proposed auditor's report; (iii) Review of selected audit documentation relating to the significant judgments the engagement team made and the conclusions it reached; and (iv) Evaluation of the conclusions reached in formulating the auditor's report and consideration of whether the proposed auditor's report is appropriate.
Article 35. The engagement quality control reviewer shall also consider the following: (i) The engagement team's evaluation of the firm's independence in relation to the audit engagement;
(ii) Whether appropriate consultation has taken place on matters involving differences of opinion or other difficult or contentious matters, and the conclusions arising from those consultations; and (iii) Whether audit documentation selected for review reflects the work performed in relation to the significant judgments and supports the conclusions reached. (ii) Significant risks identified during the engagement and the responses to those risks.
(iii) Judgments made, particularly with respect to materiality and significant risks.
(iv) Whether appropriate consultation has taken place on matters involving differences of opinion or other difficult or contentious matters, and the conclusions arising from those consultations.
(v) The significance and disposition of corrected and uncorrected misstatements identified during the engagement.
(vi) The matters to be communicated to management and those charged with governance and, where applicable, other parties such as regulatory bodies.
(vii) Whether working papers selected for review reflect the work performed in relation to the significant judgments and support the conclusions reached.
(viii) The appropriateness of the report to be issued.
Article 56. The engagement quality reviewer conducts the review in a timely manner at appropriate stages during the engagement so that significant matters may be promptly resolved to the reviewer's satisfaction before the report is issued.
Article 57. Where the engagement quality reviewer makes recommendations that the engagement partner does not accept and the matter is not resolved to the reviewer's satisfaction, the report should not be issued until the matter is resolved by following the firm's procedures for dealing with differences of opinion.
APPENDIX B Variable Definitions
Audit adjustment variables EPRE
Pre-audit annual earnings. EAUD Audited annual earnings.
ADJDUM
Indicator variable equal to one if there is an audit adjustment to annual earnings (i.e., EPRE ≠ EAUD), and zero otherwise.
ADJMAG
The absolute magnitude of the audit adjustment (i.e., │EPRE -EAUD│/│EPRE│). LnADJMAG Natural log of (one plus) ADJMAG.
Rank(ADJMAG)
The ranked value of ADJMAG.
Partner ownership variables OWN_REV Ownership of the review partner (%).
OWN_ENG1
Ownership of the lead audit engagement partner (%).
OWN_ENG2
Ownership of the second audit engagement partner (%).
OWN_ENG
Ownership of the two engagement partners (= OWN_ENG1+ OWN_ENG2). LnOWN_REV Natural log of (one plus) OWN_REV.
LnOWN_ENG1
Natural log of (one plus) OWN_ENG1.
LnOWN_ENG2
Natural log of (one plus) OWN_ENG2. LnOWN_ENG Natural log of (one plus) OWN_ENG. HERF Herfindahl measure of the audit firm's ownership concentration (measured as the sum of squared ownership percentages of all partners in the firm).
Company control variables
LnTA Natural log of the company's total assets. LEV Ratio of total liabilities to total assets.
ROA
Ratio of net income to total assets.
LnSUBS
Natural log of (one plus) the number of subsidiaries.
SOE
Indicator variable equal to one if the company's ultimate owner is the government or a state-owned entity, and zero otherwise.
Auditor control variables TENURE
Length of tenure between the audit firm and client (measured in years).
EXP_REV
Experience of the review partner (measured as the number of years since obtaining a CPA license).
EXP_ENG1
Experience of the lead engagement partner (measured as the number of years since obtaining a CPA license).
EXP_ENG2
Experience of the second engagement partner (measured as the number of years since obtaining a CPA license).
EXP_ENG
Total experience of the engagement partners (= EXP_ENG1 + EXP_ENG2). PORT_REV Number of public company audits on which the review partner worked during the current year.
PORT_ENG1
Number of public company audits on which the lead engagement partner worked during the current year.
PORT_ENG2
Number of public company audits on which the second engagement partner worked during the current year. PORT_ENG Total number of public company audits on which the engagement partners worked during the current year (= PORT_ENG1 + PORT_ENG2). Table 1 The effect of equity ownership on a partner's share of distributable profits -a numerical example.
The points target sets a maximum for the total number of points awarded to each partner during the year and the points target is set higher for a partner who has a larger ownership stake. The number of points awarded is determined by the partner's performance during the year. The partner's share of profits is determined by the partner's share of the total number of points awarded. Table 3 Descriptive statistics (N = 5,413). Table 4 Pair-wise correlation matrix.
The variables are defined in Appendix B. Correlation coefficients in bold are statistically significant at the 5% level or better (two-tailed).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Table 5 Audit adjustments and partner ownership.
Cols.
(1) and (2) are estimated using fixed effects logit models because the dependent variable (ADJDUM) is binary. Cols. (3) to (6) are estimated using fixed effects least-squares models because the dependent variables (LnADJMAG and Rank(ADJMAG)) are continuous. All variables are defined in Appendix B. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. (2) and (3) are estimated using fixed effects least-squares models because the dependent variables (LnADJMAG and Rank(ADJMAG)) are continuous. All variables are defined in Appendix B. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. Table 7 Audit adjustments, partner ownership, and ownership concentration.
